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ARTICLES 
WHERE OIL IS KING 
Kristen van de Biezenbos* 
 
Donald Trump has won the 2016 presidential election, and, based on his 
campaign rhetoric, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the next four 
years will see a rollback of federal rules and regulations originally 
intended to combat climate change and environmental pollution in favor of 
increased production of fossil fuels, including coal.  This raises the question 
of where we can look for protection of environmental goals, if not to federal 
law or agencies.  Unconventional solutions to energy and environmental 
issues may be the only way to move forward on environmental challenges in 
the near term. 
This Article suggests one such unconventional solution to the problems 
presented by the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”).  In response to 
the perceived environmental threats of fracking, many cities and towns have 
sought to limit it through local bans, moratoria, and regulation.  However, 
in 2015, a number of states passed laws that forbid any city, town, or other 
municipal body from banning fracking or passing certain regulations on the 
practice.  Further, the highest courts of several other states have ruled that 
state law preempts local restrictions on fracking.  In many cases, this 
means that local governments must allow fracking, so the question arises as 
to how these governments can address environmental concerns.  This 
Article is the first to propose that cities and towns where fracking is taking 
place could incorporate and enforce existing state environmental laws.  By 
doing so, those municipalities may be able to minimize some of the 
environmental harms associated with fracking.  Further, this Article 
explains why incorporation and enforcement of state-level environmental 
laws by cities and towns should not be expressly or impliedly preempted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There was a time when hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” was hailed by 
the oil and gas industry and by environmentalists as a positive development 
for the U.S. energy industry.  Fracking, it was believed, provided a path 
toward the sometimes at-odds goals of American energy independence and 
lowered carbon emissions.1  From an industry perspective, fracking, 
combined with horizontal drilling, opened up to exploration new and 
previously unreachable oil and natural gas shale formations and oil sands.  
It also boosted domestic production.2  Fracking not only made money for 
companies that engaged in fracking, but it also provided a tremendous boost 
to U.S. oil production, meaning that we could begin to satisfy our domestic 
thirst for nonrenewables like oil and natural gas without having to import 
oil from member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), like Saudi Arabia.3  Early environmental supporters of 
the technique pointed out that fracking produces an abundance of natural 
gas, which produces less than half the carbon dioxide emissions of coal and 
can thus be viewed as a transition fuel, helping to ease the move from fossil 
fuels to renewable sources of energy.4 
But the tides of public opinion have turned against fracking.5  No longer 
seen as a possible solution, fracking has come under fire from 
 
 1. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
351, 355–56 (2015) (noting that fracking has been endorsed by some environmental groups). 
 2. See id. at 354–55 (describing the ways in which fracking coupled with horizontal 
drilling has caused a sea change in the domestic oil and natural gas industries); see also 
David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433–34 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., Kenneth Artz, Fracking Leading to Economic Growth, Rapid Job Creation 
in North Dakota, HEARTLAND INST. (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.heartland.org/ 
news-opinion/news/fracking-leading-to-economic-growth-rapid-job-creation-in-north-dakota 
[https://perma.cc/4D5L-8J7G].  OPEC includes oil exporting nations in the Middle East, 
Africa, and South America. See Member Countries, ORG. PETROLEUM EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/T4VH-F63M]. 
 4. See Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions:  A History of Effective State 
Regulation, Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. & 
TECH., no. 49, 2010, at 1, 4–5; see also Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in 
Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 231 (2010) (“The quintessential bridge fuel 
in America may be natural gas, which is abundant and unit-per-unit releases relatively few 
greenhouse gas emissions when burned, as compared to other traditional fuels such as 
coal.”); Bjorn Lomborg, A Fracking Good Story, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2012), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/project_syndicate/2012/09/thanks_to_fracking_
u_s_carbon_emissions_are_at_the_lowest_levels_in_20_years_.html [https://perma.cc/622 
L-U6LE]; Aaron Task, Fracking:  It’s Good for the Economy . . . AND the Environment, 
YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-
ticker/fracking-good-economy-environment-155325507.html [https://perma.cc/RYC2-UP 
9T]. 
 5. See, e.g., Robert Rapier, Fracking Has Been Around Since 1949, Why the Recent 
Controversy?, GLOBAL ENERGY INITIATIVE, http://globalenergyinitiative.org/insights/58-
fracking-has-been-around-since-1949-why-the-recent-controversy.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/788E-XGVS].  The controversy, at the most basic level, is between 
adverse effects on human heath, wildlife, and the environment allegedly caused by fracking 
versus its many economic benefits, especially for traditionally poorer rural areas.  For 
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environmental groups and media outlets as the public has focused on the 
possible threats fracking poses to human health and the environment, 
particularly after the release of the film Gasland,6 which included dramatic 
images of citizens living near fracking operations in Pennsylvania setting 
their tap water on fire due to high methane content.7  Critics have also 
pointed out that there is still much about the environmental impact of 
fracking that is not known, especially with respect to the impact of waste 
disposal, contamination of surface water, and earthquake activity near 
fracking sites.8  Fracking has also garnered opposition from landowners 
who do not want the sounds and disruptions that accompany fracking—not 
 
contrasting positions on fracking, compare Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http:// 
www.foodandwaterwatch.org/problems/fracking (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (claiming that 
fracking is too dangerous because of health and environmental concerns and providing 
multiple resources in support) [https://perma.cc/8DWJ-A2J5], with Pioneering America’s 
Energy Future, ENERGY FROM SHALE, http://www.energyfromshale.org/americas-energy 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (purporting to explain why “fracking offers good news for 
America”) [https://perma.cc/2CB6-66JH].  This Article does not take a position between 
these two poles.  It should also be noted that, according to a 2013 study by the University of 
Texas, a majority of Americans who are familiar with fracking also support it. See Steve 
Brooks, UT Energy Poll Shows Divide on Fracking, UT NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), http:// 
news.utexas.edu/2013/04/09/ut-energy-poll-shows-divide-on-fracking (“Just over half of 
consumers are still not familiar with hydraulic fracturing, commonly called ‘fracking.’  Of 
those who are, 45 percent support it, while 41 percent oppose it.  There’s a similar split over 
fracking on public lands, with 41 percent wanting to promote the practice and 36 percent to 
ban it.”) [https://perma.cc/PS5T-4N6M]. 
 6. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010).  This film provoked its own miniature 
controversy as being too one sided and prompted the rebuttal film FrackNation, which 
questions whether the tap water shown as being flammable in Gasland might be naturally 
methane-infused water or “burning springs” that predate fracking. See FRACKNATION (Ann 
and Phelim Media 2013).  As an illustration of the complex politics swirling around fracking 
globally, the director of FrackNation, who is Irish, claims that the International Monetary 
Fund censored him when they refused to show a clip of his film during his appearance before 
the group. Andrew Trotman, Fracking Filmmaker Accuses IMF of Censorship, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/ 
9947124/Fracking-film-maker-accuses-IMF-of-censorship.html [https://perma.cc/H79X-
M2SS].  According to the director, the IMF was bowing to pressure from Russia, which 
allegedly sees fracking as a threat to the dominance of its state oil behemoth, Gazprom. Id. 
 7. The Huffington Post review of Gasland is an excellent encapsulation of the film’s 
effect on the public perception of fracking. Stewart Nusbaumer, Big Sky Doc Film Fest:  
Gasland Fuel for Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2010, 5:12 AM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/stewart-nusbaumer/big-sky-doc-film-fest-emg_b_467605.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZC3E-R3WZ].  After pointing out that the process was pioneered by 
Halliburton, which was once headed by former Vice President Dick Cheney, the review 
states: 
Gasland addresses Is fracking safe?  You want to guess? . . .  We see water that 
can be lit on fire right out of the faucet.  We hear from chronically ill residents, all 
with the same mysterious symptoms, that live next to drilling areas in disparate 
locations.  We feast our eyes on a slew of huge pools of toxic wastes and dead 
animals—it’s an ugly, deadly mess. 
Id. 
 8. There are over 400 local fracking bans in the United States alone. See Spence, supra 
note 1, at 351–52.  With respect to seismic activity, the scientific consensus is that fracking 
is not causing earthquakes (at least, not any earthquakes of noticeable intensity) but that 
wastewater injection wells are. See Induced Earthquakes, USGS, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/myths.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/87J8-LJYN]. 
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to mention the “boomtown” explosion of road construction and the influx of 
oil workers—to mar their neighborhoods.9  Even communities that once 
welcomed fracking operations as an economic boon have struggled with the 
associated costs, including building roads to allow large trucks to transport 
well and drill parts and constructing storage facilities for fracking fluid and 
proppant.10 
In addition to the political and environmental controversies that surround 
it, fracking is also of particular interest to energy scholars because of its 
unique position in the fragmented world of U.S. energy regulation.11  
Although most energy sources such as coal, hydropower, and nuclear power 
are overseen by a collection of federal, state, and local actors, fracking is 
subject to little federal oversight and inconsistent state regulation—and as 
such, it is, in many ways, the Wild West of energy production, with the 
only real limits being those imposed by communities and by states.12  Some 
have also argued that, in states where the oil and gas industry is powerful 
like Texas and Oklahoma the only ones actually regulating fracking are the 
oil and gas industries themselves.13 
Perhaps in part because fracking is not comprehensively regulated, a 
compelling body of literature has developed on the issue of local authority 
over fracking—specifically, whether and why local bans and restrictions on 
fracking are positive developments.14  Thus far, the majority of scholars 
have weighed in favor of power for local governments to ban or regulate 
 
 9. See, e.g., Dan Solomon, ExxonMobil CEO Doesn’t Want a Fracking Operation Near 
His Backyard, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.texasmonthly.com/daily-
post/exxonmobil-ceo-doesnt-want-fracking-operation-near-his-backyard [https://perma.cc/42 
45-ZXYW].  Note that Denton did pass a fracking ban, which led the Texas legislature to 
pass H.B. 40, one of the laws that spurred this Article. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2015); see also Texas Stops Cities and Towns from Banning Fracking, BBC, (May 19, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32805973 [https://perma.cc/EW53-BM 
A8]. 
 10. See Spence, supra note 1, at 367–68. 
 11. See James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1357, 1358–59 (2014) (noting that the failure of the federal government to pass 
comprehensive energy regulations has forced the states to take the lead); Hari M. Osofsky & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 778 (2013) 
(describing the regulatory picture of energy in the United States as fractured, noting 
“patterns of inadequate regulatory authority; simultaneous overlap and fragmentation; and 
entities in public regulatory roles enmeshed with, and at times partially made up of, the 
private actors that they ostensibly regulate across numerous types of energy law”). 
 12. See, e.g., Tim McDonnell and James West, It’s the Wild F*ing West out There, 
MOTHER JONES (Nov.–Dec. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/11/ 
fracking-safety-north-dakota [https://perma.cc/6893-DGFM]. 
 13. See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the 
Energy Revolution:  Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1555 (2014).  Note that Professors Dana and 
Wiseman refute this view, stating that the regulators they encountered were not simply 
beholden to the oil and gas industry. See id. at 1555 n.130. 
 14. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 1, at 376–84; Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking 
from the Ground Up, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 29, 34–36 (2015); see also Joshua P. 
Fershee, How Local Is Local?:  A Response to Professor David B. Spence’s The Political 
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 61, 63–74 (2015) (looking more 
specifically at the success of local bans in surviving legal challenges). 
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fracking operations.15  Increasingly, however, states with significant 
existing fracking operations are growing impatient with local bans and 
restrictions on fracking, which is not surprising given the enormous 
economic boost fracking can provide—both to localities in the short term 
and to the state in the longer term.16  What is missing from the conversation 
is what cities and towns may do to regulate or otherwise put limits on how 
and where fracking takes place when they do not have the option of banning 
fracking outright.  This is an important question because fracking, perhaps 
above all other extractive techniques, has serious impacts on local 
communities. 
However, there is a growing rift between state and local governments 
over fracking.  Leading what appears to be a burgeoning state movement to 
prohibit local fracking bans altogether and curtail local regulations are 
Texas, Oklahoma, and North Carolina.  In early 2015, Texas and Oklahoma 
passed House Bill 4017 (H.B. 40) and Senate Bill 80918 (S.B. 809), 
respectively.  North Carolina followed with Senate Bill 119 (S.B. 119) in 
late September of 2015.19  All three laws claim that state regulation of oil 
and gas preempts20 local laws and regulations and that municipal 
governments may not enact stricter regulations on the industry than those 
imposed by state law.21  H.B. 40 goes a step further in prohibiting cities and 
towns from passing regulations that would prohibit fracking or make it 
“commercially [un]reasonable.”22  Although supporters argue that these 
laws are necessary to protect the rights of private property owners who are 
deprived of the money that they might receive from fracking on their 
property by local bans,23 the laws go much further.  Additionally, recent 
 
 15. See supra note 14. 
 16. In Texas, for example, five of the state’s cities were among the top fifteen places in 
the United States to recover from the 2008 recession, and, of those five, three—Midland, 
Odessa, and Laredo—can attribute their success to fracking. See Julie Verhage, Here Are the 
15 Cities That Have Done the Best (and the Worst) Since the Recession, BLOOMBERG (June 
22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-22/here-are-the-15-cities-that-
have-done-the-best-and-the-worst-since-the-recession [https://perma.cc/7VEC-HGRR].  This 
is true even though a decline in dry gas (including natural gas) prices has led to a slowdown 
in fracking and other oil and gas operations associated with dry gas production, although 
note there has not been a similar slowdown in oil and gas liquids (such as propane and 
ethane) production. See id. 
 17. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 18. See S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015).  The Oklahoma law also gives the 
state exclusive jurisdiction over wastewater wells, which have been found to be responsible 
for increased seismic activity. Id. 
 19. See S.B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015). 
 20. As discussed more fully in Part I, H.B. 40 specifically reads that the State of Texas 
has occupied the field of oil and gas regulation, even though Texas does not in fact 
comprehensively regulate oil and gas. See David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 691 (2011). 
 21. See N.C. S.B. 119; Okla. S.B. 809; Tex. H.B. 40. 
 22. Tex. H.B. 40.  The Oklahoma law, on the other hand, does specifically reserve for 
municipalities the power to use zoning, setback requirements, and other traditional local 
regulations to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. See Okla. S.B. 809. 
 23. See Wade Goodwyn, New Texas Law Makes Fracking Bans Illegal, NPR (May 20, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/20/408156948/new-texas-law-makes-local-fracking-
bans-illegal (including the comment made by Todd Staples, president of the Texas Oil and 
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court decisions in Louisiana and Colorado striking down local moratoria on 
fracking suggest that many cities and towns must live with the reality of 
fracking within their communities.24 
This Article acknowledges that there are benefits to state control that 
justify the state as the first line in fracking regulation.25  In particular, state-
level regulation promotes intrastate consistency in the law, at least from the 
perspective of compliance (although the lack of federal regulation means 
there is no such consistency across the states, and it is arguable whether 
allowing states to control oil and gas regulation has led to a race to the 
bottom, where residents of states that depend heavily on the energy industry 
bear more of the fracking burden).26  However, if a state assumes such 
control, it places itself in the position of being the only governmental body 
overseeing the oil and gas industry.  This, in turn, places the burden on the 
state to ensure that the industry addresses negative externalities imposed 
upon the state, particularly with respect to potential harm to local air and 
water quality.  Because many states are not equipped to deal with the 
environmental challenges posed by fracking at the city and town level, it 
makes sense to give these municipal governments an expanded role in 
addressing those challenges. 
This Article argues that if states does not or cannot ensure compliance 
with their environmental regulations, cities and towns may be able to do it 
for them.  Further, taking this route should not raise state preemption 
concerns because the cities are not passing regulations that are inconsistent 
with, or in excess of, state law.  Indeed, states already do the same thing 
when they pass laws to enforce federal regulation, a practice the U.S. 
Supreme Court has permitted.27  Additionally, this Article addresses the 
other important policy goals that would be furthered if local governments 
were permitted to incorporate and enforce state environmental laws, 
 
Gas Association, that “[i]f a city wants to stop an activity, you know, our Constitution 
protects the rights of property owners.  And they just need to pay them for that, but this [city 
of Denton fracking] ban did not allow that”) [https://perma.cc/2ER4-CTTT]. 
 24. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016); 
St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, 199 So. 3d 3 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
 25. As a practical matter, there is no “silver bullet” that would restore the ability of 
municipalities in all states to ban fracking.  Under preemption and federalism principles, 
either the federal or state governments will have primary authority over the regulation of oil 
and gas in a broad sense, and municipalities will not be able to enact conflicting laws or 
regulations.  It is the position of this Article that approaching the problem of what powers a 
municipality does have with respect to oil and gas should be based on the current reality of 
regulation of oil and gas by the states.  Although several authors have made compelling 
cases for federal control of oil, gas, and fracking in particular, there are several reasons why 
this is not likely in the foreseeable future.  These reasons are discussed in detail in Part II. 
 26. This author believes that loopholes in federal environmental laws that exempt 
fracking should be closed, but, as discussed in Part I, the environmental problems that 
fracking can cause are just one reason why the process is so controversial.  The other reason 
is the serious impact on the quality of life of residents located near fracking sites.  This 
Article argues that only local governments can adequately respond to such uniquely local 
concerns. 
 27. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
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including retaining the benefits of the federalist system and increasing 
citizen confidence in the democratic process. 
Part I examines the uneven regulatory landscape of fracking, provides an 
overview of the fracking process, and examines how the role of local 
governments differs in two states:  (1) Pennsylvania, which has an uneasy 
mixture of state and local control, including state attempts to override local 
bans, and (2) Texas, which did not enact a single city-wide ban on fracking 
until late 2014, prompting the passage of H.B. 40 only months later.28  Part 
II provides a historical overview of the state’s role in the evolution of oil 
and gas regulations generally and provides a broad overview of the 
uncertainty surrounding state-local power structures, as well as when and 
how the doctrine of preemption has been used by states to strike down local 
ordinances.  Part III argues that local governments—particularly those in 
states that have banned local regulation of the oil and gas industry—should 
incorporate and enforce state environmental regulations.  Doing so avoids 
preemption issues and furthers important policy goals. 
I.  THE FEDERALISM DEBATE:  
WHO SHOULD REGULATE FRACKING? 
The regulation of energy sources in the United States is complex, with 
different local, state, and federal agencies governing different aspects of 
energy extraction, production, pricing, and consumption.  To make matters 
even more complicated, the makeup of regulatory actors also changes 
depending on the energy source.29  With respect to oil and gas, regulation 
has traditionally been a state matter, but the reality is more complex.30  The 
various actors taking part in the regulation of oil and gas today can be 
likened to the layers of an onion:  at the federal layer, there are regulations 
for the control of emissions and the protection of wildlife and the 
environment;31 at the state layer, approval of applications to frack or drill 
are made; at the local layer, cities and towns regulate by way of zoning and 
setback requirements, which allows them to exercise some control over 
where and how the drilling takes place.32  Some states have clashed with 
local governments over the latter’s regulations and have argued that state 
laws preempt local regulations, either expressly or by occupying the field.33 
 
 28. See Aleem Maqbool, The Texas Town That Banned Fracking (and Lost), BBC (June 
16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33140732 [https://perma.cc/TN64-S 
A7Y]. 
 29. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778–79. 
 30. See Spence, supra note 1, at 369–70 (noting that “[r]egulation of onshore oil and gas 
production has traditionally been a state matter, and producing states have statutes in place to 
regulate oil and gas production,” but noting that federal regulation and local bans on fracking 
are also in play). 
 31. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778.  Although, as discussed below in 
Part I, fracking is not subject to federal environmental laws. 
 32. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons, 2014 BYU L. 
REV. 1543, 1547–53. 
 33. See id.  Even states that allow local zoning ordinances require state-level permitting 
to proceed with drilling operations. See Hannah J. Wiseman, The Capacity of States to 
Govern Shale Gas Development Risks, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8376, 8379–81 (2014).  On 
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While these layers might suggest that regulation of fracking is 
comprehensive, that is not the case.  Regulatory dynamics between states 
and local governments vary, and, as Professors Hari Osofsky and Hannah 
Wiseman have pointed out, there are serious gaps in the regulation of oil 
and gas extraction, including drilling, that have yet to be adequately 
addressed by any regulatory body.34  Further, some existing federal 
regulations, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, do not cover fracking, 
which raises the question of whether the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) should take steps to more comprehensively address fracking or 
whether state environmental agencies can adequately address those gaps.35 
Despite the proliferation of fracking wells in recent years, no clear 
answer on who should regulate each part of the process has developed.  To 
some extent, this may be a product of our national failure to decide where 
our priorities should lie—i.e., whether economics trumps environment or 
vice versa.  Indeed, it has been observed that opinions on whether federal or 
state governments should assume control of fracking may be politically 
motivated.36  As Professor Michael Burger stated, “Those who envision 
private profit and the expansion of American power tend to favor state 
regulation.  Those who fear environmental and public health risks, along 
with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel economy, tend to favor federal 
regulation.”37  While this may be an oversimplification, there is no question 
that the regulation of fracking is a politically charged issue.  And, as noted 
above, there is recent literature that advocates for local regulation (usually 
in the form of vetoes or bans) of fracking over both state and federal 
control.38 
To better understand how local and state regulations of fracking interact, 
it is useful to understand what fracking is and how varied the dynamics 
between state and local regulations are from state to state.  The following 
part will address both of these issues and will also compare the results of 
 
the federal front, fracking has raised concerns about impacts on threatened species.  
Interestingly, it is not always the fracking process itself that causes the greatest 
environmental impact; just as potentially destructive is the construction of access roads to 
the drilling pad and waste disposal areas. See Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering 
Giant:  How Horizontal Drilling Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear 
on Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1152–64 (2013). 
 34. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778. 
 35. Many scholars have argued for greater federal regulation of fracking, particularly by 
including it in relevant environmental statutes. See, e.g., Michael Burger, Fracking and 
Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150, 159–63 (2013); Angela C. Cupas, The 
Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act:  Why We Must Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing at the 
Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605, 606–09 (2009); Hannah 
Wiseman, Untested Waters:  The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production 
and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 182–87 (2009) 
(arguing that the federal government should regulate fracking under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act). 
 36. See Michael Burger, The (Re)federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1483, 1486.  Burger himself suggests a hybrid federal-state regulatory model. See id. 
at 1486–87. 
 37. Id. at 1486. 
 38. See supra note 14. 
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two states’ moves to preempt local regulation of fracking:  Pennsylvania, 
where a state challenge to local bans failed, and Texas, a state that has 
recently passed legislation intended to preempt local bans and regulations. 
A.  Fracking:  An Old Technology with a New Twist 
Fracking itself is not a new technology.39  The process was first used in 
1947 in Kansas and quickly became widespread—according to the 
Geological Society of America, there are over a million wells throughout 
the country that were drilled using fracking and traditional vertical drilling, 
meaning that the drill is pointed downward during the entire process of 
drilling the well.40  Although there are several fracking methods, all have 
certain features in common.  During fracking, as the well is being drilled, 
millions of gallons of water mixed with an assortment of chemicals and 
sand or ceramic beads called “proppant”41 are injected into the ground to 
fracture or expand fractures in the shale and reach the impacted oil and 
gas—this cocktail of water, chemicals, and proppant is known as “fracking 
fluid.”42  The fracking fluid can vary in consistency from water to gel, and 
may contain chemicals ranging from methanol acid to diesel fuel (although 
some companies have informally agreed not to use the latter).43  Companies 
are not required by federal law to reveal the chemical makeup of the 
fracking fluid they use (although many states do require such disclosures), 
which may contribute to some local resistance to the process.44 
Fracking can be thought of as using the highly pressurized water to make 
cracks in the shale or tight sands in a similar fashion as a rock hitting a 
windshield.  Once the cracks have opened, the fracking fluid flows into 
those cracks to hold them open.45  Then, when the water is removed from 
the well, the change in pressure causes the oil and any associated natural 
gas to flow from the cracks up the wellbore, or the channel made by the 
drill.46  When this process was eventually combined with horizontal 
drilling, a boom was born—vast resources of oil and natural gas that were 
 
 39. See Just the Facts, ENERGY DEPTH, https://energyindepth.org/just-the-facts/ (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4Z9K-T9LF]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. The chemicals used in fracking water have evolved over time, especially in the 
1980s and 1990s, with an emphasis on “operational efficiency rather than . . . potential 
environmental or human health impacts.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, 
EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 4-1 (2004). The impact of water-based 
fracturing drilling fluid storage and waste is discussed in more depth in Part II. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Wiseman, supra note 35 at 118–19 (offering a more comprehensive overview of 
the technical aspects of fracking, including the concerns over chemicals used in fracking 
fluid). 
 44. See Cupas, supra note 35, at 605–07.  The EPA did promulgate a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to consider whether fracking fluid should be regulated under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, but a final rule has not been released. See Natural Gas Extraction—
Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/2ZNE-JRNE]. 
 45. See Wiseman, supra note 35, at 120. 
 46. See id. 
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previously unreachable because of the low permeability of shale and tight 
sands suddenly became accessible.47  It should be noted, however, that 
fracking is used to access oil and gas in shale formations; once that access 
has been created, the well becomes conventional.  In other words, fracking 
is not the entire life of a well, only its birth.  Once a well has been fracked, 
pulling the oil and gas out is done in the same manner as any other type of 
well. 
Despite the fact that fracking is only one stage of extracting oil and gas 
from a shale play, it is not a small or isolated process.  Even compared to 
conventional drilling operations, it is an expensive, loud, and disruptive 
activity that increasingly takes place near residential areas.48  As discussed 
above, while there are significant gaps in fracking regulation on a national 
scale, state governments do regulate many aspects of the process, from 
granting permits to minimizing air pollution to the cleanup and disposal of 
wastewater.49 
While some states delegate many of these functions to oil and gas or 
railroad commissions, other states have moved those duties to state 
environmental agencies.50  The traditional emphasis for most state oil and 
gas laws has been promoting the industry and making the acquisition of 
mineral rights more efficient, but local concerns over health and the 
environment have prompted some states to pass fracking-specific 
regulations.51  And there are certainly many communities that have 
welcomed fracking and the economic effects it brings, especially in rural, 
economically depressed areas.52  However, other communities and larger, 
denser cities have not been so welcoming. 
B.  State and Local Conflicts in Fracking Regulation 
One of the major reasons why fracking has become such a political flash 
point is because of the enormous impact that fracking operations have on 
nearby communities and the fear of drinking water contamination by 
fracking fluid.  Even more than many conventional oil wells53 and some 
 
 47. See id. at 120–23. 
 48. See id. at 123–28. 
 49. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 777–79. 
 50. See Spence, supra note 1, at 368–69. 
 51. See id. at 368–71. 
 52. See id.; see also DANIEL RAIMI & RICHARD NEWELL, DUKE UNIV. ENERGY 
INITIATIVE, SHALE PUBLIC FINANCE:  LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND COSTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT (2014) (studying the costs and benefits of the 
fracking boom and concluding that “the net impact of recent oil and gas development has 
generally been positive for local public finances,” except for some areas in the Bakken 
Shale); Wiseman, supra note 35, at 121–27. 
 53. It is true that some enhanced oil recovery techniques used in conventional oil and 
gas recovery can be much more complex undertakings than a traditional oil drilling platform 
or pump jack, but one aspect of fracking that sets it apart from other well stimulation 
techniques is the need for millions of gallons of water, which must be stored, transported, 
and disposed of.  See Wiseman, supra note 35 at 118–19, Enhanced Oil Recovery, 
ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/fe/science-innovation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oil-
recovery (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3YNU-SXPN]. 
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types of enhanced oil recovery methods, fracking is a major undertaking 
that involves heavy truck traffic, very loud noises (both while the well pad 
is being constructed and during the fracking process itself), the installation 
of infrastructure to process and transport natural gas, scores of new workers 
who need housing and services, and millions of gallons of water that must 
be transported, stored, and disposed of.54  Even if it were possible to make 
the direct environmental threats of fracking—including the possibility of 
drinking water contamination and the release of carbon dioxide and 
methane—vanish overnight, fracking would still be controversial because 
of the incidental environmental effects that light, noise, and truck exhaust 
can have on the quality of life of residents who live, work, and go to school 
near well sites.55 
It is presently impossible to make the direct environmental effects of 
fracking vanish or, indeed, to address them comprehensively.  This is both 
because approaches to regulating the environmental effects of fracking vary 
widely from state to state and because, even when a state does have strong 
environmental laws, those laws are not always enforced.56  This Article 
specifically addresses the problems faced by cities and towns within states 
that forbid local fracking bans and do not effectively enforce existing 
environmental protections. 
In some ways, there are two Americas when it comes to fracking:  the 
America that forbids fracking altogether or permits local bans on the 
practice, which includes states like New York, Vermont, Maryland, 
California, and Pennsylvania, and the America that welcomes fracking, 
which includes states like Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
Ohio, and Colorado, where state law limits what cities and towns may do to 
regulate fracking operations.57  In the latter America, legal challenges to 
local bans or ordinances citing federalism tend to come out in the state’s 
 
 54. For a vivid description of how a town (here Dimock, Pennsylvania) can be affected 
by fracking, see Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Mess, VANITY FAIR (June 2010), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/06/fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006 
[https://perma.cc/U296-G9S6]. 
You don’t need to drive around Dimock long to notice how the rolling hills and 
farmland of this Appalachian town are scarred by barren, square-shaped clearings, 
jagged, newly constructed roads with 18-wheelers driving up and down them, and 
colorful freight containers labeled “residual waste.” Although there is a 
moratorium on drilling new wells for the time being, you can still see the 
occasional active drill site, manned by figures in hazmat suits and surrounded by 
klieg lights, trailers, and pits of toxic wastewater, the derricks towering over barns, 
horses, and cows in their shadows. 
Id. 
 55. In this way, objections to fracking are similar to those concerning mountaintop 
removal mining. See infra Part II. 
 56. For an excellent overview on how states vary in their regulatory approaches to oil 
and gas and seem to rarely engage in sharing information on the efficacy of these approaches 
with one another, see Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 
1679–86 (2014). 
 57. See Spence, supra note 1, at 371–73.  Note that the bans in Vermont and Maryland 
seem to be largely symbolic, since there are no significant shale formations in either state 
that would attract fracking activities. See Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local 
Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1166–67 (2015). 
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favor, thanks to extensive state regulations and an economy that is 
dependent, to some extent, on oil and gas.58 
As Professor David B. Spence has pointed out, several states, including 
Louisiana and Colorado, have seen local bans fail to gain traction due to 
strong state laws that preempt the field of oil and gas, including local vetoes 
on extraction processes.59  When state oil and gas laws expressly preempt 
or occupy the field—that is, regulate oil and gas so comprehensively that 
there is nothing left for local governments to govern—local regulation or 
bans on fracking may not be possible or even desired.60 
What is different about laws like H.B. 40, S.B. 809, S.B. 119, and 
proposed laws in Indiana,61 New Mexico,62 Kansas,63 Florida,64 and 
Colorado65 is that they represent what appears to be a concerted effort by 
states to expressly prohibit bans on fracking, even if such bans are what 
local residents desire.  Also, as discussed in more detail below, some of 
these laws seek to prohibit certain types of regulations that are traditionally 
within the power of local governments, especially home rule cities, when 
they adversely impact fracking and other extractive techniques.66  The 
solution proposed in this Article, however, does not require state control 
over oil and gas—rather, it provides a way for any locality to assert more 
environmental oversight where fracking is taking place.  To illuminate the 
difference in state regulations over local control of oil and gas, it is useful to 
look at two states, Pennsylvania and Texas, where such regulations had 
very different results. 
C.  The Regulatory Landscape of Fracking:  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania has a long relationship with the energy industry.  That 
legacy began with the 1775 discovery of anthracite coal in the northeastern 
part of the state (which would later come to be known, appropriately, as 
“the Coal Region”).67  By 1860, commercial mines in the Coal Region were 
producing and shipping coal all over the country.68  By the dawn of the 
 
 58. See Spence, supra note 1, at 371–73. 
 59. See id. (detailing the various types of preemption—express, field, and conflict—that 
have been used to strike down local bans and some regulations of fracking); see also City of 
Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016); St. Tammany Parish 
v. Welsh, 199 So. 3d 3 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
 60. See Spence, supra note 1; see also Wiseman, supra note 35, at 157–68. 
 61. See H.B. 1299, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014). 
 62. See S.B. 421, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015). 
 63. See S.B. 245, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
 64. See H.B. 1205, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015). 
 65. See H.B. 1119, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015). 
 66. As discussed in more detail in Part II, when a state constitution designates cities over 
a certain population as being home rule cities, the only limits placed on what those cities 
may do with respect to local regulation are where the state has specifically stated that the 
cities may not regulate. See generally Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting 
Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927 (2015) (providing an in-depth analysis of state and 
local power sharing with respect to renewable energy development). 
 67. JOHN STUART RICHARDS, EARLY COAL MINING IN THE ANTHRACITE REGION 7 (2002). 
 68. See id. 
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twentieth century, the state’s population had exploded, especially in the 
northeast, and “area mines were producing fully 57 million tons of 
anthracite coal annually.”69 
But a mere two decades later, the economic boom provided by the Coal 
Region was fading.  Anthracite, an extremely high carbon form of coal that 
is difficult to ignite and is much more expensive than lower-carbon bitumen 
or lignite coal, began to decline in popularity at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.70  While anthracite was suitable for heating small 
residential spaces, the demand was now for very high quantities of cheaper, 
lower-carbon coal to provide larger-scale steam-electric power 
generation.71 
Additionally, all types of coal now faced serious competition from oil 
and gas, which were increasingly replacing coal as the fuel of industrial 
engines because they were easier to transport.  The advantage of oil was 
particularly dramatic with respect to ships and locomotives, which had for 
decades required men to shovel the coal into boilers.72  The decline of the 
Coal Region, coupled with the steel crisis of the 1970s and the larger 
national trend of a shrinking manufacturing sector, put large parts of 
Pennsylvania in bleak economic circumstances through much of the rest of 
the century.73 
Although the predominance of coal as the energy source of choice during 
the Industrial Revolution made the Coal Region an economic powerhouse 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pennsylvania is also the 
birthplace of oil and gas drilling.  Prior to the 1850s, petroleum had been 
harvested in Pennsylvania from oil seeps, or surface oil, by dragging cloth 
through the substance and then wringing it out.74  But then, a Pennsylvania 
entrepreneur named Samuel Kier began keeping the petroleum that welled 
up during the drilling of his salt mines and experimenting with possible 
uses of the substance.75 
Kier subsequently founded the first oil refinery in 1859 to convert 
petroleum to kerosene for use in lamps.  Around the same time, George 
 
 69. THOMAS DUBLIN & WATER LICHT, THE FACE OF DECLINE:  THE PENNSYLVANIA 
ANTHRACITE REGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–3 (2005). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 3.  To get an idea of how much coal was needed during the Industrial Age, the 
RMS Titanic had three engines powered by twenty-nine boilers that required over 600 tons 
of coal a day. See ANTON GILL, TITANIC:  THE REAL STORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
WORLD’S MOST FAMOUS SHIP 147–48 (2012).  That coal, in turn, had to be shoveled 
continuously by hand around the clock into the boilers. See id.  When she sank, the Titanic 
had over eight thousand tons of coal in her holds. See id. 
 72. See DUBLIN & LICHT, supra note 69, at 3; see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE:  THE 
EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER, at xiv-xv (1990) (detailing Winston Churchill’s 
decision to switch the vessels of the British Navy from coal power to oil in part because of 
the manpower required to shovel coal). 
 73. See DUBLIN & LICHT, supra note 69, at 3–4; see also STEVEN C. HIGH, INDUSTRIAL 
SUNSET:  THE MAKING OF NORTH AMERICA’S RUST BELT, 1969–1984 (2003). 
 74. See YERGIN, supra note 72, at 9. 
 75. HILDEGARDE DOLSON, THE GREAT OILDORADO:  THE GAUDY AND TURBULENT YEARS 
OF THE FIRST OIL RUSH:  PENNSYLVANIA, 1859–1880, at 80 (1959). 
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Bissell founded the Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company and, inspired by 
Kier’s capture of oil by drilling for salt, began drilling for just the oil in the 
western part of the state.76  Bissell struck oil using the drilling method in 
1859, and the nation’s first oil rush was ignited.77  By 1891, Pennsylvania 
“produced 31 million barrels of oil, 58 percent of the nation’s oil that 
year.”78  But other states soon began to surpass Pennsylvania in terms of oil 
output, and by 1907, the boom was over and production in the state had 
stabilized.79 
Pennsylvania is also one of the birthplaces of the modern fracking boom.  
After the combination of the technique with horizontal drilling was 
perfected in Texas’s Barnett Shale, it was quickly exported to the largest 
shale play in the United States, the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania.80  
Following the oil crisis of the 1970s, the U.S. Department of the Interior 
funded research into mapping shale plays across the country that held vast 
reservoirs of oil and gas that could not be reached using conventional 
drilling methods.81  One of the larger shale formations identified by 
geologists was the enormous Marcellus Shale, which stretches over 95,000 
square miles from Virginia to New York along the Appalachian Basin (the 
Marcellus’s sheer size and location is behind its nickname, the “Beast in the 
East”).82 
Fracking yielded dramatic results in the region in a very short time.  The 
first well in Pennsylvania (and the Marcellus) using horizontal drilling and 
fracking was sunk in 2003.  By the end of 2011, hundreds of millions of 
cubic feet of natural gas were being produced by fracking from the 
Marcellus Shale, and at least fifteen major interstate pipelines were in 
various stages of approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC).83  But the economic benefits that initially thrilled Pennsylvanians 
began to dim in the face of some of the negative local impacts of fracking, 
including increased truck traffic, a lack of affordable housing when oil 
industry employees snapped up rentals, and the strain put on local services 
by a rapidly growing population.84  Environmental concerns over the effect 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 87. 
 80. Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 229, 231–34 (2010). 
 81. John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale—An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in 
Pennsylvania, 38 PA. GEOLOGY, Spring 2008, at 2, 3–5; Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange 
Trip It’s Been:  Moving Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 
U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 621 (2011); see also DAVID A. WAPLES, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 
IN APPALACHIA:  A HISTORY FROM THE FIRST DISCOVERY TO THE TAPPING OF THE MARCELLUS 
SHALE 280 (2012). 
 82. WAPLES, supra note 81, at 80. 
 83. Id.; see also Pifer, supra note 81, at 621 (“Following the drilling of the Renz #1 well, 
the number of Marcellus wells drilled in Pennsylvania each year began to increase at an 
exponential rate—two wells were drilled in 2005, eleven in 2006, thirty-four in 2007, 210 in 
2008, 768 in 2009, and 1,454 in 2010.  Thus, by the end of 2010, a total of approximately 
2,500 Marcellus wells had been drilled in Pennsylvania.”). 
 84. Pifer, supra note 81, at 625. 
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of fracking on drinking water and air quality also began to grow, 
particularly after the 2009 release of the documentary Gasland.85 
Local regulations and bans on fracking began to gain popularity, and 
state officials responded in 2012 by enacting an amendment to the 
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, known as “Act 13.”86  One of the provisions 
of Act 13 was chapter 33, which “prohibit[ed] any local regulation of oil 
and gas operations, including via environmental legislation, and require[d] 
statewide uniformity among local zoning ordinances with respect to the 
development of oil and gas resources.”87  This provision of Act 13 was to 
go into effect sixty days after the legislation was passed.88  Between the 
time Act 13 was passed and the date it was to go into effect, a group of 
plaintiffs, including several counties, boroughs, and townships, filed suit in 
Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.89  The plaintiffs argued that Act 13 
violated several provisions of the state constitution, including due process 
and article 1, section 10 on the “inherent rights of mankind.”90  The lower 
court agreed that the provision was unconstitutional.91 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the lower court that 
certain provisions of Act 13, including chapter 33, violated state citizens’ 
right to due process because it required the changing of local zoning laws 
“without regard for basic zoning principles and, thereby, failing to protect 
interests of property owners from harm and altering the character of 
neighborhoods.”92  The court noted with approval the lower court’s 
observation that “local government . . . relies on public input to produce a 
rational plan of development.”93  The court continued, “Act 13 requires 
municipalities to act affirmatively to allow incompatible uses [in residential 
neighborhoods] such as ‘drilling operations and impoundments, gas 
compressor stations, storage and use of explosives’ in all zoning 
districts.”94 
The court rejected Pennsylvania’s contention that the sudden change in 
local zoning laws was reasonably related to its police power, citing the 
lower court’s finding that the purpose of Act 13’s usurpation of local 
zoning power could only be justified “if compliant with the comprehensive 
plan of the community.”95  Because Act 13 was not compliant, it was not 
reasonably related to the state’s police power.96  Thus, the state supreme 
 
 85. See generally Ion Bogdan Vasi et al., “No Fracking Way!” Documentary Film, 
Discursive Opportunity, and Local Opposition Against Hydraulic Fracturing in the United 
States, 2010 to 2013, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 934 (2015) (arguing that the film Gasland helped to 
create the antifracking movement worldwide). 
 86. See Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (Pa. 2013). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 90. Id. at 915. 
 91. Id. at 916. 
 92. Id. at 931. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 932. 
 96. Id. 
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court struck down those provisions of Act 13 that would have prevented 
local bans on fracking.97 
However, this result has not deterred other states from passing laws 
similar to Act 13.98  This is probably because, as illustrated in Texas, other 
states do not have similar environmental guarantees in their constitutions 
that would defeat such laws.  This may not stop due process challenges 
where the state uses a law like H.B. 40 to subvert local zoning and planning 
authority whenever that authority conflicts with proposed drilling sites.  
Indeed, the Texas state legislature seems to have drafted H.B. 40 with very 
little concern for the possibility of it being struck down on any 
environmental grounds, whether those grounds are constitutional, as in 
Robinson Township, or rooted in some other legal principle, such as the 
public trust doctrine.99 
D.  The Regulatory Landscape of Fracking:  Texas 
Like Pennsylvania, Texas has a long history with the energy industry, but 
most of it has been with oil and gas.  The first Texas oil rush occurred in 
Spindletop, just outside of Beaumont, in 1902.  At that time, Texas 
observed the “pure” common law rule of capture when it came to oil and 
gas, meaning that the owner of the oil was the person who pulled it out of 
the ground, regardless of where the oil originated.100  This incentivized 
drilling as many wells as possible on land that drillers owned or to which 
they leased the mineral rights in an attempt to suck up as much oil from 
underground as they could.101  The result was a dramatic depletion of the 
Spindletop reservoir within a few years and massive amounts of waste 
resulting from spills and well blowouts.102 
A few years later, in 1919, the state forbade waste of oil and natural gas 
and delegated the authority of creating and enforcing comprehensive oil and 
gas regulations to an agency it had created a few decades prior, the Texas 
 
 97. See id. 
 98. See, e.g., S.B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st 
Sess. (Okla. 2015); H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 99. The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine under which the state is treated 
as holding lands under navigable waters in trust for its citizens, such that it cannot undertake 
any projects that would destroy access to those submerged lands.  In the past few decades, 
the doctrine has been expanded in some states to encompass not just land under navigable 
waters but clean air, water, and land in general. See Alexandra B. Klass, Fracking and the 
Public Trust Doctrine:  A Response to Spence, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 47, 49–51 (2015). 
 100. See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas 
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900–12 (2005).  This is the law referred to in the famous “I 
drink your milkshake” scene in the film There Will Be Blood. 
 101. The Spindletop Oil Boom has been described as a “feeding frenzy of human sharks.” 
See Mary G. Ramos, Oil and Texas:  A Cultural History, TEX. ALMANAC, http:// 
texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/5MBQ-6YYC]. 
 102. See DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 
24 (2011).  One massive blowout, the Lucas gusher, released up to 10,000 gallons of crude 
oil a day for nine days until it was capped. See Ramos, supra note 101. 
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Railroad Commission (“the Commission”).103  The Commission created 
rules governing the manner of drilling, well spacing, waste disposal and 
handling, and separation of oil and associated natural gas, as well as 
requirements for record keeping by drilling companies.104  In 1934, the 
Commission’s jurisdiction was extended to petroleum and petroleum 
byproducts.105 
The power held by the Commission over Texas oil and gas operations 
cannot be overstated.  In fact, the Commission’s comprehensive control 
over oil and gas in Texas and its price-setting cooperation with other state 
oil and gas agencies under the Interstate Oil and Compact Commission led 
the magazine Scientific American to refer to the agency as the “world’s first 
oil cartel.”106  Anyone who believes that an energy company has violated 
the Commission’s rules, whether they are a private property owner or 
municipality, must present their case before the Commission.  If the 
Commission believes a violation has taken place, it will assess the 
appropriate fine and direct the offending drilling company to correct the 
violation.107  If, however, it determines there is no violation, no report of 
agency action is made.108  In this way, the Commission makes it difficult to 
tell how many complaints are made against oil and gas companies in Texas 
because records exist only where a violation was found.109 
Thus, Texas comprehensively regulates oil and gas at the state level, but 
that does not mean that cities have no role.  Municipalities in Texas have 
historically enjoyed the right to regulate oil and gas activity as long as they 
do so in a way that is consistent with regulations promulgated by the 
Commission.110  The principle is that “municipalities in Texas have, under 
the police power, authority to regulate the drilling for and production of oil 
and gas within their corporate limits, when acting for the protection of their 
citizens and the property within their limits, looking to the preservation of 
good government, peace, and order therein.”111 
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One frequently cited example of successful local regulation of oil and gas 
is Fort Worth, located on the oil-and-gas-rich Barnett Shale play.  Fort 
Worth, which has a population of nearly one million,112 formed a city 
commission in 2006 to make recommendations for the regulation of 
fracking.113  The result was a city ordinance that regulates, among other 
things, “noise levels, drilling of fresh water wells, compressor stations, 
landscaping and screening, drilling within a floodplain, saltwater disposal, 
measures for controlling water quality, road repairs, and . . . the allowable 
distance from existing structures that wells may be drilled.”114  The city 
also regulates the permitting of gas wells and requires the use of a closed 
loop mud system that keeps waste inside the wellbore during the drilling 
process.115  Further, while drilling may take place any time at urban well 
sites, the actual fracking process may only be performed during daylight 
hours and not at all on Sundays.116  Finally, the ordinance also includes 
mechanisms to enforce these requirements.117 
Fort Worth regulated fracking in this way without state interference for 
eight years, but then, in late 2014, something changed.  Less than an hour 
from Fort Worth is Denton, Texas, an affluent suburb of Dallas.  Like Fort 
Worth, Denton is located in the Barnett Shale play.118  In 2014, Denton 
made international headlines as the first Texas city to campaign seriously 
for a ban on fracking within city limits.119  Denton was actually the first 
city in Texas to pass fracking regulations of any kind,120 but over time the 
city became frustrated by the number of oil and gas wells that were 
“grandfathered” under the old state law regime and thus were exempt from 
the city’s new regulations.121  In many cases, although these grandfathered 
wells were originally drilled in more remote areas, development and growth 
resulted in the wells being closer to buildings and residences than city 
ordinances allowed.122  Consequently, these wells could be fracked even if 
they violated Denton’s setback, zoning, or other local ordinances.123 
Reportedly frustrated by the problem of grandfathered wells and the fear 
that they would lead to fracking in the city’s heart, a group of Denton 
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citizens, students, and environmental activists formed Frack Free Denton, a 
group whose goal was enacting a total ban on fracking in the city.124  On 
August 4, 2014, the city passed a ban on fracking by a wide margin.125  
Although Denton was not the first Texas municipality to consider a fracking 
ban, the reaction of the powerful Texas Oil and Gas Association (TXOGA) 
to the formation of Frack Free Denton and the publicity the group received 
was swift:  while the members of Frack Free Denton celebrated, TXOGA 
filed its lawsuit in the local district court.126  A few months later, the state 
legislature passed H.B. 40, a bill that expressly preempts local laws 
regulating oil and gas activities.127 
After signing H.B. 40 at a state house ceremony in Austin, Texas, 
Governor Greg Abbott praised the new law, describing the bill as “so 
incredibly important.”128  The purpose of the bill, according to Governor 
Abbott, is to do the “profound job of protecting private property rights.”129  
TXOGA said the same thing:  Denton’s fracking ban unfairly prevented 
private property owners from leasing their mineral rights to oil and gas 
companies that wanted to drill or frack on their land.130  But H.B 40 goes 
further.  The bill, which is more expansive than the bills that followed it in 
Oklahoma and North Carolina, provides that no municipality may “enact or 
enforce an ordinance or other measure, or an amendment or revision 
[thereof] that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates an oil and gas operation 
within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or 
political subdivision.”131 
H.B. 40 does make an exception:  municipalities may pass ordinances 
touching on some aboveground activity, including “regulation[s] governing 
fire and emergency response, traffic, lights, or noise, or imposing notice or 
reasonable setback requirements” provided that such regulations are 
“commercially reasonable.”132  “Commercially reasonable” means that any 
such aboveground regulations cannot interfere with the ability of a 
“reasonably prudent operator to fully, effectively, and economically exploit, 
develop, produce, process, and transport oil and gas, as determined based 
on the objective standard of a reasonably prudent operator and not on an 
individualized assessment of an actual operator’s capacity to act.”133 
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H.B. 40 thus appears to condition even traditional municipal powers on 
whether it makes fracking more expensive or difficult.  H.B. 40 is an 
unprecedented challenge to the status of Texas’s home rule cities because it 
does not just tell the cities that they may not directly regulate oil and gas 
(which they traditionally could do, provided those regulations were 
consistent with state laws), but it also tells the cities that they may not enact 
any law, even traffic ordinances or noise and light restrictions, that hampers 
oil and gas operations. 
Within weeks of the passage of H.B. 40, the Oklahoma legislature passed 
S.B. 108.134  North Carolina followed a few months later.135  These state 
laws are not the only way that local governments have been prevented from 
regulating oil and gas directly—local bans and moratoria have also been 
struck down by state courts as impliedly or conflict preempted by state 
regulations.136  There are also some cities and towns that do not wish to 
block fracking altogether but would like to exercise some control over 
whether and how fracking takes place.  Yet even these kinds of regulations 
can be met with stiff resistance at the state level.137 
II.  STATE VERSUS LOCAL CONTROL OF FRACKING 
Traditionally, states oversee large-scale regulation of the oil and gas 
industry, with “large-scale” referring to well and intrastate pipeline siting.  
Small-scale regulation, such as zoning that affects the placement of well 
pads, the control of light and noise from drilling operations, and access and 
storage of water, has historically been handled by local governments.  This 
reflects a longstanding approach of relegating matters of unique local 
character, like the distance between a well pad and a school, to local 
governments. 
Each state has different state-local dynamics.  Notably, there is less 
deviation in the abilities of cities and towns to regulate the small-scale 
aspects of fracking as there is in their abilities to enact blanket bans on 
fracking.  The extent to which cities may enact outright bans on fracking 
depends, to some extent, on the degree of autonomy they have from the 
state government.  This is because, although nearly all cities in the United 
States are home rule cities, what “home rule” means depends on how the 
powers of cities and localities are created.  Still, while understanding the 
principle of home rule cities explains why states are now passing laws that 
expressly prohibit local regulation of oil and gas, the solution proposed in 
this Article applies to both home rule cities and other municipal bodies. 
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A.  How States Control the Regulation of Fracking 
There is rich scholarship surrounding the idea that at least some large-
scale control over fracking—typically, over where fracking may occur—is 
best left to state governments.138  Those who argue for federal regulation 
may be concerned that state and local governments are too likely to be 
swayed by the oil and gas industry instead of recognizing that fracking is 
particularly disruptive, not only to the surrounding ecosystem but to any 
nearby human populations. 
Despite the potential merits of a federal regulatory approach to oil and 
gas activities, there are two major reasons why, for the foreseeable future, 
this is probably not in the cards.  First, Congress is much more divided on 
the issue of oil and gas, and fracking in particular, than it was on coal 
mining (which is subject to some federal oversight), especially now that 
federal environmental regulations and state renewable portfolio standards 
have pushed many electric utilities to switch to more natural gas-fired 
power plants over coal.139  This has created a strong demand for natural 
gas, which fracking produces in great quantities. 
Second, the EPA has been moving toward cooperative federalism in its 
regulatory models that put more and more direct authority in state hands 
because, as a practical matter, the agency does not have the resources to 
oversee all of the activities that fall within its regulatory purview.140  The 
fracking boom in particular poses a very real budgetary challenge for the 
EPA:  the U.S. had over 1.7 million fracked wells in 2015.141  The EPA 
simply cannot comprehensively monitor each and every well for regulatory 
compliance.142  The same argument can be made against state regulation of 
fracking, and in favor of local regulation of fracking, because state 
environmental agencies are also often fighting strained budgets and a lack 
of oversight. 
In assessing what local governments can do to have a meaningful voice 
in the environmental impacts of fracking, it is useful to think of two 
particular areas where local police power might come into play:  
environmental and zoning concerns.  Local governments regulate both 
environmental issues and zoning through their police power—i.e., their 
power to regulate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.  
This Article is primarily concerned with how local governments may still 
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exercise regulatory authority in ways that address citizens’ environmental 
concerns regarding fracking operations.143 
B.  The Contours of State and Local Government Power 
The contours of intrastate preemption—that is, when state law trumps 
local law—are notoriously ill defined.  While the U.S. Constitution makes 
clear that federal law preempts state law, it is not as clear why and under 
what circumstances state law should preempt local law.144  Part of the 
problem is that the relationship between states and municipalities is not as 
clearly hierarchical as the federal-state relationship.  Is the state primary to 
the city, or do the two have more or less concurrent powers, parallel but 
rarely overlapping?145 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, it became popular to 
characterize municipal governments as subordinate to their home states in 
all matters.  This idea—called “Dillon’s Rule”—is closely associated with 
Judge John Forrest Dillon, a state and then federal judge who wrote an 
influential treatise on municipal corporations after the Civil War.146  In an 
1868 opinion, Judge Dillon famously stated, “Municipal corporations owe 
their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the 
legislature.  It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they 
cannot exist.  As it creates, so may it destroy.  If it may destroy, it may 
abridge and control.”147 
Under Dillon’s Rule, the state’s power over local governments is near 
absolute.148  This view holds that local governments may exercise only 
powers expressly or impliedly granted by state legislatures and those 
powers necessary to carry on local business.149  Because Dillon’s Rule does 
not permit local governments to exercise any authority within the state’s 
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police power, there is little chance of a preemption problem:  cities and 
towns simply cannot engage in substantive policymaking.150 
Today, only a few states use Dillon’s Rule as the backbone of the state-
local relationship—although many more states use some version of the rule 
for municipalities that do not meet the state requirements for home rule.151  
Cities in these states still have only those legal powers affirmatively granted 
to them by the states, which might explain why S.B. 180 seems more 
permissive toward local lawmaking, specifically allowing municipalities to 
regulate for the health and safety of residents—it has to be to allow any 
lawmaking that might affect oil and gas operations to take place.  Compare 
this to H.B. 40, which specifically prohibits cities and towns from passing 
any law that has an adverse commercial impact on oil and gas operations, 
with a specific list of exceptions.152  As discussed below, Texas is a home 
rule state, with cities that have much greater leeway in exercising their legal 
authority. 
However, even Dillon’s Rule acknowledged that municipalities do have 
some inherent powers that inure to it by virtue of its recognition by the 
state.153  According to Professor David Barron, these inherent powers were 
“quasi-private corporate powers,” and Dillon himself explained that “[i]n 
many of its more important aspects a modern American city is not so much 
a miniature State as it is a business corporation,—its business being wisely 
to administer the local affairs and economically to expend the revenues of 
the incorporated community.”154  “Local affairs” has a long history of 
including the municipal police power, which is the “earliest and strongest of 
municipal powers.”155  This police power included “the protection of public 
health and safety, the regulation of public order, and the requirement that 
people comport themselves so as not to harm others or their property.”156 
Although Dillon’s Rule did recognize a certain degree of inherent local 
authority, the idea that cities and towns only had authority beyond their 
municipal police power if the state expressly granted that authority was 
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challenged by contrary views, including the “Cooley Doctrine,” which 
espoused the theory of an inherent right to local self-determination.157  This 
doctrine is named for Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas M. Cooley, 
who stated in an 1871 opinion that “local government is a matter of 
absolute right; and the state cannot take it away.”158  The Cooley Doctrine, 
among other historical influences,159 may have been a factor in the late 
nineteenth-century development of the home rule city, which, for the 
purposes of this Article, follows the definition laid out by Professor Paul 
Diller:  “[A] system of state and local relations that gives some degree of 
permanent substantive lawmaking authority to localities beyond that which 
was provided by the traditional Dillon’s Rule regime.”160 
The move toward home rule cities has been described as an attempt to 
increase the participation of citizens in the democratic process, although 
this account has been challenged.161  According to Professor Barron, home 
rule is often enshrined as a powerful argument in favor of local autonomy, 
but the reality may be messier.162  Instead, home rule is one way that 
legislatures can defer making politically difficult decisions in increasingly 
complex metropolitan areas under the guise of promoting autonomy.163 
As Professor Uma Outka has noted, another historical holdover in state-
municipal power structures is the fact that they develop in a reactionary 
manner, meaning that local governments first begin governing and then 
states stepped in afterward to define the limits of each locality’s 
authority.164  How the state chooses to define those limits—whether by 
state constitution, by statute, or in practice—is important as well because 
defining local powers in the state constitution makes it considerably more 
difficult for the state legislature to alter or abridge those powers.165  Most 
U.S. cities today are home rule cities, with certain powers over inherently 
local matters, but those powers are not unlimited.166 
C.  Home Rule Cities and Intrastate Preemption 
Although the precise contours of their powers vary from state to state, 
home rule cities generally have all powers except those the state has 
expressly reserved for itself.167  Most states recognize that cities over a 
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certain population threshold are home rule cities, meaning (at least 
theoretically) that they have “exclusive control over affairs peculiar to the 
locale governed.”168  The development of home rule cities began in the 
nineteenth century, as many states started delegating more day-to-day 
control to cities, either by constitution or statute.169  There are conflicting 
accounts of what propelled the movement toward home rule and what 
policy goals that movement was intended to achieve, which helps explain 
why the term means different things from state to state.170 
The generally accepted view of home rule cities is that they may exercise 
any power not expressly withheld from them by the state.171  This means 
that even a home rule city’s minor ordinance can be expressly preempted by 
state legislation if that legislation specifically overrides local regulations on 
a certain subject matter.  For example, states have passed legislation 
preventing local governments from banning smoking, banning plastic bags, 
raising the minimum wage, implementing rent control, and, most recently, 
protecting LGBT groups through antidiscrimination measures.172 
In many ways, the battle over fracking bans unfolding throughout the 
country is just another verse of a familiar song:  that of an industry 
protesting to the state when cities and towns pass regulations that negatively 
impact that industry.173  Although cities and towns can act as important 
policy innovators that are often on the vanguard of legal reform, some local 
ordinances may be met with strong resistance from impacted groups.174  
When controversial local laws are passed, businesses or interest groups that 
are impacted by those laws generally file preemption claims, arguing that 
the city cannot pass a law that is inconsistent or otherwise in conflict with 
state laws.175 
With respect to fracking, concerns over the economic effects of local 
fracking bans, moratoria, and regulation have prompted state action to 
curtail municipal regulations that might frustrate oil and gas operations.  In 
Texas, for example, the state constitution enshrines home rule cities as 
possessing local powers to the fullest extent possible.  As the Supreme 
Court of Texas has stated: 
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It was the purpose of the Home-Rule Amendment . . . to bestow upon 
accepting cities and towns of more than 5,000 population full power of 
self-government, that is, full authority to do anything the legislature could 
theretofore have authorized them to do.  The result is that now it is 
necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to 
such cities but only for limitations on their powers.176 
Thus, “if the Legislature decides to preempt a subject matter normally 
within a home-rule city’s broad powers, it must do so with ‘unmistakable 
clarity.’”177 
This is precisely what the state of Texas did when it passed H.B. 40, 
forbidding cities and towns from enacting bans, moratoria, or most 
regulations over oil and gas activities.178  But even where the state 
legislature has not expressly forbidden a home rule city from regulating oil 
and gas, state courts may still find that there is an unacceptable conflict 
between state and local laws.  The home rule city of Fort Collins, Colorado, 
discovered this when its five-year moratorium on fracking—instated so that 
the environmental effects of the technique could be better understood—was 
struck down by the state supreme court for being in “operational conflict” 
with state oil and gas regulations.179 
The lesson here is that, despite their theoretically greater autonomy, 
home rule cities are just as likely as their non-home rule counterparts to 
have their ordinances struck down by state legislatures or courts.  Although 
scholars such as Professor Diller have suggested that courts should afford a 
high deference to local ordinances unless they “clearly contravene the 
purposes of state law,” the reality is that many courts seem to do just the 
opposite by assuming that local ordinances must fall when allegedly 
preempted by state law.180  While this Article suggests a solution that could 
work in home rule or non-home rule cities, the reality is that state 
legislatures and state courts have the power to preempt any local ordinance, 
no matter how legally sound the underpinning of that ordinance might 
be.181  What makes the solution in this Article more likely to survive is that 
all local governments already have certain types of environmental 
ordinances in place, and, as discussed in Part III, incorporation of a state-
level law should not be preempted, since it is furthering and not frustrating 
the state regulatory scheme. 
 
 176. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. 1948). 
 177. In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Dallas Merch.’s & 
Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993)). 
 178. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 179. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016). 
 180. Diller, supra note 146, at 1173. 
 181. The problem of intrastate preemption is the subject of several excellent articles, but 
as Professor Diller points out, no single sweeping approach to local ordinances would work 
for all states, given the variance both between home rule and non-home rule jurisdictions and 
between home rule jurisdictions that derive their power from state constitutions versus state 
statutes. See id. at 1173–74. 
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III.  PRESERVING LOCAL POWER OVER THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
OF FRACKING THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAW 
One of the concerns for citizens in oil and gas producing states is that, 
even though there may be laws on the books to protect air, water, land, and 
other aspects that directly affect local environmental concerns, those states 
do not adequately enforce the laws.182  This part will provide an overview 
of the problem of inadequate enforcement in several states, including Texas, 
and provide a possible solution:  the local incorporation and enforcement of 
state environmental laws.  This solution can be employed by cities in every 
state, not just those with active oil and gas operations.  There are, however, 
practical concerns that must be acknowledged. 
It is important to reiterate that this Article argues for municipal 
incorporation of general environmental laws touching upon air and water 
quality standards, not on the incorporation of state oil and gas regulations.  
The reason why this distinction is important is because states have 
traditionally regulated oil and gas operations183 and state court decisions 
and statutes prohibiting local oil and gas regulation apply (or purport to 
apply) preemption to local laws that directly regulate those operations.  
There is also the problem of cost.  While incorporating state laws may not 
cost a municipality much, enforcing them is another matter.  Consequently, 
larger and more affluent cities are more likely to be able to employ 
inspectors, maintain documents, and pursue compliance efforts—although it 
is also likely that local governments already have some type of licensing 
and enforcement program in place to enforce existing local environmental 
ordinances.  Thus, this Article’s proposed solution may not be feasible for 
some localities and may only be necessary when fracking operations cannot 
be stopped by local veto or regulated directly by municipal law. 
A.  Enforcement Gaps:  When State Environmental Laws 
Are Strong on Paper but Weak in Application 
If a state chooses to remove the power of municipalities to ban or 
regulate oil and gas activities, the state makes itself the sole custodian of its 
citizens’ health and safety vis-à-vis fracking and other extractive activities.  
This proposition might not be of concern to local citizens if states were 
stringent about enforcing environmental laws that protect air, water, and 
 
 182. See infra Part III.A; see also Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community 
Environmental Policing:  Assessing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental 
Regulation, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 383 (2003) (discussing how poor state 
enforcement of environmental laws led to citizen groups, called “bucket brigades,” that 
initiate their own enforcement efforts). 
 183. Before H.B. 40, however, Texas courts recognized local police power, permitting 
local governments to regulate oil and gas operations to the extent that those regulations were 
consistent with their police power. See Unger v. Texas, 629 S.W.2d 811, 812–13 (Tex. App. 
1982) (“[M]unicipalities in Texas have, under the police power, authority to regulate the 
drilling for and production of oil and gas within their corporate limits, when acting for the 
protection of their citizens and the property within their limits, looking to the preservation of 
good government, peace, and order therein.” (quoting Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 
S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App. 1944))). 
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soil, both inside and outside of the context of fracking, but budgetary 
restraints have created enforcement gaps in many states.184  Thus, in some 
areas, there is a double bind:  fracking may not be banned, nor is there 
sufficient state enforcement of environmental protections.  Similarly, at the 
federal level, the EPA budget has remained flat in recent years, and the 
agency has been accused of having insufficient resources to oversee state 
compliance with federal environmental laws.185  Because citizens have 
more direct channels of communication to their municipal governments, 
localities can respond directly to environmental issues, including issues 
stemming from fracking operations or other extractive techniques, in a more 
directed manner.  To avoid preemption by state environmental laws, 
however, localities may not wish to attempt enacting their own regulations.  
Instead, they can incorporate existing state environmental laws and enforce 
them locally.186 
B.  Local Enforcement of State Environmental Regulations 
The incorporation of state environmental laws at the local level is one 
way in which municipalities can exercise their police power to protect 
citizens where they cannot directly regulate oil and gas.  In fact, 
incorporating state environmental laws protects local residents in many 
contexts, not just where fracking is concerned.  In a sense, this proposition 
is simply strengthening the already multilevel nature of environmental laws:  
these state laws already apply to local actors, but for reasons described 
above, the state is not always in the best position to be aware of potential 
violations or to enforce its own regulations. 
 
 184. See, e.g., Environmental Spending in the 50 States, BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/Environmental_spending_in_the_50_states (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) 
(showing environmental budget changes across the states from 2011 to 2015, although these 
numbers do not indicate on what programs the money is being spent) [https:// 
perma.cc/TV86-U8G6]; Andrew Kenney and Craig Jarvis, Cuts to DENR Regulators Jarring 
in Wake of Dan River Spill, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 8, 2014, 3:16 PM), http:// 
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article9102665.html (detailing the continuing budget 
cuts and reorganization of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, now the Department of Environmental Quality) [https://perma.cc/VRW4-EY8P]; 
Joe Wertz, State Impact:  Why Continued State Funding Cuts Could Squeeze Programs 
Protecting Public Water, NPR (Feb. 4, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/ 
oklahoma/2016/02/04/why-continued-state-funding-cuts-could-squeeze-programs-
protecting-public-water/ (noting that the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality’s 
budget has declined nearly 30 percent from 2009 to 2016) [https://perma.cc/X7WF-ZQCY].  
This same is true in Florida, where the legislature came very close to passing a ban on local 
fracking vetoes. See, e.g., Jeff Burlew, More Than 1,100 State-Employee Positions Cut, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 23, 2015), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/ 
2015/06/23/state-employee-positions-cut/29154335/ (detailing the impact of state budget 
cuts on Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection) [https://perma.cc/8YAJ-TNAU]. 
 185. See Joe Davidson, EPA’s Fall in Flint, an Aberration or Part of a Pattern?, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2016/01/28/ 
epas-fall-in-flint-an-aberration-or-part-of-a-pattern/ (containing data showing that agency 
inspection and enforcement has declined because there was little money leftover after 
bureaucratic spending) [https://perma.cc/S9M6-SBFS]. 
 186. This is something states have done many times by enacting statutes that implement 
and enforce federal laws. See infra Part III. 
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Further, a state argument that its own air and water protections preempt 
local incorporation of those same protections would be discordant with the 
fact that environmental regulation is already an area of cooperative 
federalism. Congress has set minimum requirements for air and water 
protections and requirements in the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).  Every state must have either created a State 
Implementation Policy (SIP) to comply with the CAA and CWA, or it must 
have enacted its own regulatory scheme that at least meets the federal 
minimums set forth in the CAA and CWA.187  Thus, environmental 
regulation is already the subject of both federal- and state-level decision 
making. 
This cooperative federalism model promotes a centralized national 
environmental policy and seeks to ensure that all citizens have at least a 
baseline level of protection from certain environmental harms.188  This 
centralized approach is also desirable from an industry perspective because 
it promotes regulatory uniformity, which industries doing business on the 
national or state level prefer.189  The costs associated with complying with 
differing state and national laws is something that larger industries actively 
seek to avoid.  As Professor Diller has explained, industries generally resist 
local laws that are out of step with state and national laws—such as bans on 
plastic bags, trans fats, or sugary drinks—by arguing that an inconsistent 
patchwork of regulations is created by such local laws.190 
Thus, allowing localities to incorporate and enforce state environmental 
laws is consistent with the goals of centralized environmental regulations 
because it avoids the costly patchwork of state and local regulations.191  It is 
also possible that local residents can help with enforcement—the so-called 
“bucket brigades” and other local environmental task forces—and perhaps 
even strengthen otherwise weak state-level environmental law.192  
However, even the incorporation of state laws—as opposed to unique local 
ordinances—may be subject to a preemption challenge from the state or an 
 
 187. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Laws:  A 
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 256–57 (2000). 
 188. See id. at 255. 
 189. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1134 (noting that one of the reasons why industries 
may oppose local regulation, even when it might benefit them, is their interest in regulatory 
uniformity).  This obviously was not true in BCCA Appeal Group v. City of Houston, 496 
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016), where it would seem that the industrial facility owners and operators 
actually protested the enforcement of the state’s clean air and water laws by anyone, whether 
it was the TCEQ or the City of Houston. 
 190. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1134; Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 765 (2004) (“[W]ell-organized interest groups, such as business 
trade associations . . . are likely to strongly prefer uniform national rules.”). 
 191. However, it is true that some states have relatively weak environmental laws to 
begin with, and thus enforcement by local governments may not accomplish much.  In such 
cases, “bucket brigades” might be a better option. See supra note 182 and accompanying 
text. 
 192. See, e.g., O’Rourke & Macey, supra note 182, at 403–04.  Some of these citizen 
cleanup operations have, in fact, been in response to incidents at oil refineries. See id. at 392 
(describing bucket brigade efforts to clean up after explosions and other incidents at 
refineries in California and Louisiana). 
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affected party.  So, it must be possible to argue that local incorporation of 
state law survives both implied and express preemption challenges and that 
there are additional considerations that would support this option for cities 
and towns.  This Article makes the case that incorporating and enforcing 
state environmental laws at the local level should survive such 
challenges.193  Doing so, however, requires attention to a few doctrines that 
have developed in the intrastate context. 
1.  Incorporating State Law to Ensure Consistent Enforcement 
of Environmental Protections 
The first step for a local government that wishes to ensure compliance 
with state environmental laws or SIPs within its borders is to incorporate 
those laws into its local ordinances, which can be accomplished by 
reference.194  Incorporation by reference avoids potential preemption 
challenges based on differing wording between the state and local 
approaches.195  The next step would be to incorporate the rules of the state 
environmental enforcement agency.196  These rules typically set out the 
specific air and water quality requirements and the enforcement 
mechanisms and thus are key to meaningful local participation in 
monitoring and enforcing environmental compliance.197  Once the agency 
rules have been incorporated, there are several options for local 
governments, including contracting with the state environmental agency 
and creating a parallel enforcement scheme.198 
At this point, it should be noted that one city has incorporated state 
environmental laws into its own code, and its experience is instructive.  
Houston, Texas, has incorporated the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA), 
chapter 7 of the state water code, and rules of the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), “as they currently are and as they may be 
changed from time to time,” into the health section of its code of 
ordinances.199  Houston, the largest city in Texas and the fourth largest city 
in the country, has long had serious air quality problems, partially due to its 
proximity to industrial facilities, power plants, and refineries.200  Despite 
 
 193. Although, as noted in Part II, there is no way to guarantee that any local ordinance 
will not be found preempted or overruled by state legislation. 
 194. See Weiland, supra note 187, 256–57. 
 195. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1142. 
 196. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 107, at 740–78 (referencing the power of state oil and 
gas regulators, including the Texas Railroad Commission, in setting and enforcing laws). 
 197. See, e.g., City of Houston v. BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 485 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. 
App. 2013) (describing how the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality was created 
to oversee and enforce state environmental laws), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 496 S.W.3d 1 
(Tex. 2016). 
 198. See id. at 449–50 (describing the options of Texas cities in enforcing state 
environmental laws). 
 199. See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 21, art. VI, § 21-164 to -166 (2016); see 
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382 (West 1989). 
 200. In 2015, the American Lung Associated ranked Houston the sixth worst city in the 
country for air pollution—an improvement from its rankings in previous years. See State of 
the Air 2015:  Most Polluted Cities, AM. LUNG ASS’N http://www.stateoftheair.org/2015/ 
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the existence of the TCAA, Houston consistently ranks among the worst 
U.S. cities for air quality.201  In 1992, Houston enacted an air quality 
ordinance that was intended to regulate emitters not covered by the 
TCAA.202  Houston also contracted with the TCEQ to enforce emissions 
standards in the city but chose to discontinue this relationship in 2005.203  
In 2006 and 2007, the city amended its ordinance to incorporate the 
provisions of the TCAA and water code “as if written word for 
word . . . including appendices and other matters promulgated as part of the 
state rules.”204  Further, the city incorporated those provisions “as they 
currently are and as may be changed from time to time.”205  The city’s 
health officers were directed to enforce the program and impose criminal 
sanctions for violations.206 
So, contracting with the state environmental agency is an option with 
several advantages over creating a local enforcement program.  Houston 
pursued this route for over a decade until it decided that this arrangement 
was not providing adequate enforcement.207  If a local government chooses 
this route, it may not require incorporating any state laws or rules into the 
local ordinances, although doing so does give the locality potentially more 
enforcement options.  This is because the type of contracting relationship 
that Houston had with the TCEQ put inspection in the hands of the city and 
enforcement in the hands of the agency.208  When this is the case, inaction 
by the state agency could moot the locality’s efforts in inspecting emitters 
and water resources, and, without any local power grant, there is nothing 
the city or town could do about it.209 
Still, a local government could choose to follow the contracting route, 
with or without actually incorporating state law and rules, and the primary 
advantage of doing so would be that preemption challenges to such an 
arrangement are unlikely.  Where the locality and state are working 
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pursuant to an agreement to cooperate, and especially when there is no 
additional local licensing and enforcement scheme, there is no basis for 
arguing that the locality’s actions are preempted.  However, as Houston’s 
experience illustrates, taking this route is only effective if the state agency 
is willing and able to pursue violators reported by the locality.  If the 
agency is not inclined to do so, the local government may be interested in 
creating its own parallel enforcement scheme.210 
As Houston’s experience shows, incorporating and enforcing state laws 
can provoke preemption challenges.  Although there is no way to guarantee 
that any local ordinance will withstand an intrastate preemption challenge, 
this Article proposes ways in which local governments can anticipate 
preemption arguments and try to design incorporation and enforcement 
schemes to counter those arguments. 
2.  Incorporating State Law:  Express Preemption 
Generally, express intrastate preemption requires that the state has 
explicitly forbidden localities from legislating in a certain sphere.  On the 
surface, this sounds similar to the principle of independence and self-rule 
for home rule cities:  for an ordinance or other law passed by a home rule 
city to be expressly preempted by state law, that state law must clearly and 
unequivocally state that local governments may not regulate any of the 
subject matter that the state law at issue covers.211  Even though this may 
give the impression that express preemption is the only way to strike down 
a home rule ordinance, this is not always the case, although at least one 
state legislature (Illinois) and one state’s supreme court (Alaska) have made 
clear that home rule city ordinances can be defeated only by express 
preemption.212  This is very much the minority approach. 
With respect to environmental regulation, this author was not able to find 
any state laws that expressly prohibit local governments from regulating 
environmental issues broadly.  There are, however, examples of directives 
in state environmental laws to the effect that local governments may not 
regulate in a way that is inconsistent with state laws.213  This implicates 
implied, as opposed to express, preemption, which is indeed the backbone 
of intrastate preemption for both home rule and non-home rule 
ordinances.214 
 
 210. BCCA Appeal Grp., 485 S.W.3d at 451. 
 211. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1124–25.  Even express preemption is not a sure way 
to strike down a local ordinance if the state constitution prevents it. See Outka, supra note 
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 212. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1156–59. 
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496 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Tex. 2016). 
 214. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1140–42. 
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3.  Incorporating State Law:  
The Arguments Against Implied Preemption 
There are two kinds of implied preemption:  conflict and field.215  
Intrastate preemption tends to be of the conflict variety, and conflict 
preemption is further subdivided into “physical impossibility” and 
“obstacle” preemption.216  With respect to field preemption, state law could 
impliedly preempt a local ordinance when the state has so thoroughly 
regulated the subject matter—here, the environment—that there is nothing 
left for the local government to regulate.217  While field preemption has 
been used to stop local regulation of oil and gas, it would be a more 
difficult argument in the environmental context given that local 
governments already regulate environmental matters through building, 
health, air, and water ordinances. 
a.  Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption arises when it is either physically impossible to 
comply with both the state and local laws on the same subject matter or 
when the local law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”218  Many courts 
that have found local ordinances to be preempted by state law have 
employed an analysis closest to the latter category, obstacle preemption.219  
Under this preemption analysis, the question should be whether the local 
ordinance “substantially interferes with state law or the state’s 
constitutional responsibilities.”220  This would be the appropriate inquiry, 
particularly in the case of a home rule city, because preemption should be 
applied to strike down local ordinances only in rare circumstances where a 
genuine conflict with state law exists. 
However, as Professor Diller points out, there are also many examples of 
courts using a confusing and inconsistent version of the physical 
impossibility test that he terms “prohibit/permit.”221  This prohibit/permit 
approach “asks whether a local ordinance . . . ‘prohibits an act permitted by 
statute.’”222  In essence, this test rests on the proposition that the state law 
provides a regulatory baseline, and any activity above the baseline is 
permitted.  If the local ordinance attempts to punish any above-the-baseline 
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activity, the argument goes, it should be struck down as preempted.223  
Although this approach is directly counter to the authority of home rule 
cities in particular and ignores the reality of uniquely local problems 
generally, opponents of local action nonetheless frequently employ it with 
success.224 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Texas used a version of the prohibit/permit 
test to strike down the enforcement provisions of Houston’s incorporation 
of the TCAA.  Although the court of appeals had held that Houston’s 
ordinances were not preempted, because they did not conflict with state 
law, the state supreme court found otherwise in BCCA Appeal Group v. 
City of Houston.225  According to the court, the incorporation of the TCAA 
and the TCEQ rules were permissible.226  What was preempted was the 
city’s additional licensing requirements and enforcement mechanism.227  
The court reached this conclusion by looking to the TCAA and the state 
water code, both of which expressly permitted local regulations not 
inconsistent with the state law.228  In the court’s view, Houston’s ordinance 
was inconsistent with state laws because the city imposed additional 
licensing requirements for emitters and imposed possible criminal 
sanctions, even where the TCEQ had determined that there was no 
violation.229  This was Houston prohibiting what was permitted by state law 
and was thus preempted.230  The same reasoning was used to strike down 
the licensing requirement, even though failing to obtain a license was not so 
much permitted by state law as simply not addressed.231 
The BCCA Appeal Group decision is disturbing because it renders moot 
the fact that the state law itself permits local regulation of air and water.  If 
a city cannot enforce requirements identical to those imposed by the state, 
then what local regulations of air and water would survive the Texas court’s 
analysis?  Further, putting aside the court’s strained reading of Houston’s 
ordinance (which actually appears to only permit criminal sanctions where 
the TCEQ has determined that there is a violation in direct conflict the 
court’s interpretation of allowing the city to impose criminal sanctions in 
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spite of the TCEQ’s finding of no violation),232 the court also seemed to 
overlook the fact that creating a local enforcement scheme like Houston’s is 
a way to effectuate a state law, not to frustrate it. 
If a local government wishes to incorporate and enforce state law in a 
way that is more likely to survive the kind of prohibit/permit analysis used 
in BCCA Appeal Group, the locality should make very clear that additional 
licensing requirements would come with the typical fines imposed for 
failing to follow local licensing schemes.  Also, additional criminal or civil 
fines to be collected by the city should be explicitly dependent upon the 
finding of a violation by the state environmental agency. 
Adding cumulative penalties for violation of state law, as Houston did 
through criminal sanctions on top of the TCEQ’s finding of a violation and 
levying of a civil fine, only furthers the state’s interest in compliance with 
its laws.  Further, as the dissent in BCCA Appeal Group noted, if the court 
can limit the interpretation and application of the city ordinance in a way 
that is consistent with state law, it should do so in lieu of preempting the 
ordinance.233  As BCCA Appeal Group shows, there is no way to fully 
ensure that a local ordinance survives a preemption analysis because state 
courts do not give city ordinances presumptive validity or much deference, 
even when (as was true in BCCA Appeal Group) state precedent would 
seem to require it.234  However, given the importance of protecting the 
health of individuals, especially when fracking or other large-scale 
extractive activities are taking place near homes and schools, a local 
government could follow these recommendations in incorporating and 
enforcing state laws and have a strong argument that doing so should 
survive a conflict preemption analysis. 
b.  Field Preemption 
The second type of implied preemption, field preemption, may be raised 
when the state has either expressed an intent to occupy a given field of 
regulation or when a regulatory scheme is so pervasive that there is nothing 
left for local governments to regulate.235  It is difficult to argue persuasively 
that a state has pervasively regulated the field when it is complying with 
minimums set by the federal government in the CAA and CWA.  Further, 
as noted above, the CAA, the CWA, and many state SIPs acknowledge that 
local authorities play a role in environmental regulation and enforcement.236 
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However, there is an additional reason states would probably not prevail 
on a field preemption argument:  states have not occupied the field of 
environmental regulations.  Consistent with their traditional police power, 
local governments regularly pass ordinances on wastewater treatment and 
removal, the use of specified toxic materials in building codes, the handling 
of solid waste removal in the city or town limits, and more.237  Because 
both states and local governments regularly make laws in the environmental 
sphere, it would be difficult for a state to argue that it has preempted the 
field of environmental protection. 
C.  Additional Policy Considerations Against Preempting 
Local Environmental Laws 
In addition to the arguments that local adoption of state environmental 
laws should not be expressly or impliedly preempted, there are also several 
policy and prudential reasons against states attempting to use the power of 
preemption to block local adoption and enforcement of state laws.  
Although some states have expressly forbidden local bans on fracking and 
local regulation of the oil and gas industry, the solution this Article 
advocates for does not deal with the direct regulation of the extractive 
industry or its activities.  Furthermore, as many critics of preemption have 
pointed out, overuse of the doctrine by state legislatures could begin to 
erode both the benefits of the federalism model and citizens’ confidence in 
the democratic process, a likely result when voter attempts to address local 
problems are repeatedly trumped by the state. 
1.  Local Adoption of State Laws Is Not Preempted 
by State Bans on Local Oil and Gas Regulations 
States have traditionally regulated oil and gas, in part, because all state 
citizens have an interest in promoting a statewide industry that produces 
profits that can be shared by all.  By contrast, environmental laws can 
address uniquely local concerns and have traditionally also been the subject 
of local ordinances.  While there are thus important distinctions between the 
two types of regulation, one argument that should be addressed is whether 
or not incorporation of state laws is a type of de facto local regulation of oil 
and gas, something that is forbidden in several states.238 
A local government’s decision to incorporate and enforce state 
environmental laws is not a ban, limit, or other regulation on oil and gas 
operations.  Rather, it is a limit on air pollution from any source.  To the 
extent that an oil and gas operation might violate the requirements of the 
local air regulations, the result would not be a limitation on those operations 
but rather—at most—the requirement to obtain a license and paying fines in 
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the event of air or water pollution in violation of state law.  Moreover, the 
local incorporation of an existing state law does not impose substantial 
additional costs, in and of itself, on the energy industry.  Indeed, oil and gas 
companies conducting extractive activities should have already factored in 
the cost of compliance with state environmental laws.  Given the enormous 
costs associated with oil and gas activities, and fracking in particular, it is 
difficult to believe that the cost of the license and—in the case of a 
violation—a fine would make fracking commercially unreasonable. 
However, even if a court were sympathetic to this argument, localities 
can include severability clauses in their incorporation of state laws, which 
would allow the court to strike down any additional licenses or fees 
imposed by the local ordinance while letting the rest of the ordinance stand.  
The city could then reconsider how to enforce its pollution limits in 
different ways that would not necessarily impose an additional financial 
burden on oil and gas operations. 
2.  Unlike Most Oil and Gas Regulation, 
Environmental Protection Is Within Local Police Power 
A recurring theme in the literature on the power of local governments is 
the inconsistent treatment of those governments by state legislatures across 
the United States.239  Whether cities have been designated home rule by 
constitutional provision, statute, or simply through practice can change the 
understanding of what localities may do without state permission.  Yet even 
before the competing visions of local authority under Dillon’s Rule and 
home rule emerged in the United States, there was the older idea of the 
local police power.  Local police power has long been understood to extend 
to the protection of the health and welfare of residents.240  As noted above, 
the traditional powers of local governments over environmental issues by 
way of air pollution control, wastewater disposal, and building materials 
stem from this traditional notion of what cities and towns may regulate. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that local regulations over air 
pollution fall squarely within the local police power.  In Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,241 the Court considered whether federal law 
preempted a local smoke abatement ordinance enacted by Detroit, 
Michigan.242  The appellant, a vessel owner, brought suit after the city fined 
the appellant for violating the smoke ordinance when its vessels were 
docked at the city port for long periods of time.243  The state courts found 
for Detroit.244  The Court granted certiorari, and the appellant argued that 
the Detroit ordinance did not apply to its vessels because (1) the vessels 
had already passed a comprehensive licensing and inspection scheme 
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enacted by Congress, and the Detroit ordinance was expressly or conflict 
preempted by those federal requirements and (2) even if there was no 
express preemption, the Detroit ordinance was impliedly preempted by the 
Commerce Clause.245 
The Court began its analysis by noting that Detroit’s “ordinance was 
enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare of the 
city’s inhabitants.  Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air 
that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most 
traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police 
power.”246  The Court then proceeded to reject both of the appellant’s 
arguments.247  With respect to the scope of Detroit’s lawmaking power, the 
Court noted that “[t]he basic limitations upon local legislative power in this 
area are clear enough.  The controlling principles have been reiterated over 
the years in a host of this Court’s decisions.  Evenhanded local regulation to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by 
federal action.”248 
First, the Court held that the smoke ordinance was not expressly or 
impliedly preempted by the federal vessel inspection and licensing scheme 
because the purpose of the federal and state laws at issue were not mutually 
exclusive:  the purpose of the federal scheme was “to insure the seagoing 
safety of vessels subject to inspection,”249 while the purpose of the Detroit 
smoke ordinance was “elimination of air pollution to protect the health and 
enhance the cleanliness of the local community.”250  Next, the Court 
recognized that Congress itself had expressly recognized the importance of 
state and local governance in protecting public health in the text of the 
CAA:  “it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to preserve and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local 
governments in controlling air pollution.”251 
Thus, because the federal and state regimes did not overlap and provide 
conflicting or opposed directives, there was no express or conflict 
preemption based on the federal vessel inspection and licensing scheme.252  
Indeed, although the Court did not articulate this as such, its emphasis on 
the important role that state and local governments play in regulating 
pollution also suggests that there could be no field preemption in this realm, 
even if the appellants had made such an argument.253  With respect to the 
suggestion that the very existence of a federal licensing scheme precluded 
the exercise of any local law on vessels that had complied with the federal 
requirements, the Court was equally unconvinced, holding that the 
possession of a federal license “does not immunize a ship from the 
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operation of the normal incidents of local police power.”254  Finally, the 
Court noted that the smoke ordinance did not offend the Commerce Clause, 
because it applied to “‘any person, firm or corporation’ within the city” and 
thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce.255 
The Court’s opinion in Huron Portland Cement set out important 
principles with respect to local police power.  In particular, the Court 
acknowledged the primary authority of state and local governments in 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.  This does not mean 
that the federal government has no authority to regulate in the 
environmental realm, but it does suggest that the authority to do so is shared 
rather than exclusive:  federal, state, and municipal authorities all have a 
role to play in ensuring that the air, water, and soil that people are 
surrounded by does not pose a danger to people’s health. 
While it is true that Huron Portland Cement did not offer any specific 
guidance as to the balance of power when both a state and its municipalities 
seek to govern in the same space, the reality is that local governments 
already regulate extensively in the environmental context through the 
enactment of building codes—air, noise, and light pollution limits; storm 
and wastewater regulations; and more.  Thus, should a city’s or town’s 
residents believe that steps must be taken to protect the environment 
because the state is not enforcing its own laws, the decision to incorporate 
those state laws and to enforce them locally should properly be seen as a 
legitimate exercise of concurrent state and local police power. 
3.  Preventing the Adoption of State Laws by Local Governments 
Through Preemption Erodes the Democratic Process 
States that have already overruled the votes of local citizens by passing 
laws that preempt local bans on fracking should be wary of trying to block 
local incorporation of state environmental laws.  Arguably, state preemption 
of local fracking vetoes is a legitimate use of the doctrine, since the 
development of the oil and gas industry is an issue with statewide economic 
implications that could be undermined by municipal action.  However, the 
overuse of state preemption to overrule local authority undermines citizens’ 
faith in the democratic process.  How can people believe their voices are 
being heard when industries may use their political influence to override 
any local law that negatively impacts them?256  These arguments have been 
developed in federalism literature, but they apply perhaps even more 
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acutely in the context of state preemption of local laws, as citizens may be 
more aware and invested in local—as opposed to state—matters.257 
As Professor Ernest Young has pointed out, the role played by states in 
electing the national government is an important political check on the 
power of that government, but it is arguably not as powerful a check as the 
“sentiments of the people.”258  In Professor Young’s view, the real political 
check on national power by the states involves two prongs:  first, a process 
by which states can actually have an impact on national lawmaking and 
second, a guarantee that national actors can be held accountable for their 
actions after the laws are made.259  The latter idea—accountability—is 
particularly relevant for this Article.  The reason why a local government 
might want to incorporate state environmental laws is because, despite the 
existence of a process (local election of state officials) that ensures a local 
voice in the state legislature, there is no satisfactory way to hold state actors 
accountable for enforcing the laws they have passed.  Local incorporation 
allows for local enforcement, which is one way to guarantee that 
commercial actors will comply with the requirements set out by state laws. 
If, however, states were to use preemption as an argument for preventing 
local incorporation of state laws, especially when the state itself has failed 
to enforce those laws, citizen confidence in the political process would be 
eroded.  As Professor Roderick Hills has pointed out, industry interest 
groups, whose constituents have an interest in shaping favorable policies, 
frequently push federal regulation that preempts state law.260  The use of 
federal preemption thus puts a stop to the state “laboratory,” where new 
ideas, policies, and regulatory schemes may be experimented with to meet 
evolving challenges posed by those industries.261  Further, federal 
preemption of state law often fails to account for the fact that states—often 
certain states in particular—are the entities that feel the impact of the 
negative externalities produced by these same industries.262 
This is particularly true for fracking.  Only cities and towns located on 
shale plays actually see fracking activity within their borders; other 
municipalities in the same state may benefit economically from the 
development of oil and gas wells in those areas, but they will not 
experience the same negative environmental impact.  Thus, while it may be 
more defensible to utilize state preemption with respect to local oil and gas 
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regulations, the same cannot be said for environmental regulations, 
especially in municipalities where fracking is actually taking place.  If states 
were to attempt to preempt local incorporation of state environmental laws 
in such municipalities, it would likely be without real accounting for the 
disproportionate negative impact that fracking has on those municipalities.  
In addition to being arguably inefficient, state preemption in this context 
overrules the will of local citizens and erodes the political check on state 
control of what are essentially local matters. 
CONCLUSION 
Local problems require local solutions.  In states where direct local 
regulation of oil and gas activities has been prohibited by the state in an 
attempt to stop bans on fracking and other carbon projects, cities and towns 
should seek alternative ways to take action.  It has long been within the 
police power of municipalities to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens, particularly when there are uniquely local activities at issue 
that may have a disproportionately negative impact on the people living 
close to those activities.  As an extension of this police power, municipal 
governments can consider incorporating state environmental laws to ensure 
that those laws are being enforced vis-à-vis individuals and companies 
operating within those local borders.  Doing this should not be preempted 
by state bans on local regulation of oil and gas, because the regulation does 
not apply directly to extractive operations.  Further, because the local 
governments are simply enforcing existing state law, there should be no 
issue of preemption by those state laws, either express or implied. 
